贵州省道路交通安全违法行为罚款规定
贵州省人大常委会
贵州省道路交通安全违法行为罚款规定
（2004年8月2日贵州省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第九次会议通过 根据2010年9月17日贵州省第十一届人民代表大会常务委员会第十八次会议通过的《贵州省人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改部分地方性法规的决定》第一次修正 根据2011年7月29日贵州省第十一届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十三次会议通过的《贵州省道路交通安全违法行为罚款规定修正案》第二次修正）
第一条 为了加强道路交通安全管理，规范公安交通管理部门及其交通警察的执法行为，依法处罚道路交通安全违法行为，根据《中华人民共和国道路交通安全法》第一百二十三条“省、自治区、直辖市人民代表大会常务委员会可以根据本地区的实际情况，在本法规定的罚款幅度内，规定具体的执行标准”的规定，结合本省实际，制定本规定。
第二条 公安机关交通管理部门及其交通警察，对本行政区域内的行人、乘车人、车辆驾驶人以及与道路交通活动有关的单位和个人违反道路交通安全的行为，应当予以罚款处罚的执行本规定。
第三条 公安机关交通管理部门及其交通警察，对于情节轻微、未影响道路通行的交通安全违法行为，应当坚持教育为主的原则，给予口头警告后放行。
对于严重违反道路交通安全管理的违法行为应当并处暂扣或者吊销机动车驾驶证、拘留等处罚的，除按本规定的罚款标准罚款外，依法予以并处。
第四条 行人有下列行为之一的，处以5元罚款：
（一）不按交通信号指示通行的；
（二）不在人行道内行走的；
（三）在没有划分机动车道、非机动车道和人行道的道路上，不靠路边行走的；
（四）横过道路未走人行横道或者过街设施的；
（五）在无过街设施和人行横道的道路上横过机动车道，在车辆临近时突然加速横穿或者中途倒退、折返的；
（六）不按规定通过铁路道口的；
（七）列队在未实行交通管制的道路上通行时每横列超过2人的。
第五条 行人有下列行为之一的，处以10元罚款：
（一）跨越或者倚坐道路隔离设施的；
（二）在道路上使用滑行工具或者在车行道内坐卧、停留、嬉闹的；
（三）进入高速公路的；
（四）不服从交通警察指挥的。
第六条 行人有下列行为之一的，处以50元罚款：
（一）扒车或者强行拦车的；
（二）追车、抛物击车等妨碍道路交通安全行为的。
第七条 乘车人有下列行为之一的，处以10元罚款：
（一）向车外抛撒物品的；
（二）在普通公路、城市道路上乘坐车辆未按规定使用安全带的；
（三）影响驾驶人安全驾驶的；
（四）在机动车道上拦乘机动车、从机动车左侧上下车或者开关车门妨碍其他车辆和行人通行的；
（五）在机动车行驶中将身体任何部分伸出车外的。
第八条 乘车人有下列行为之一的，处以20元罚款：
（一）在高速公路上乘坐车辆未按规定使用安全带的；
（二）乘坐二轮摩托车未正向骑坐的；
（三）乘坐二、三轮摩托车不戴安全头盔的。
第九条 乘车人有下列行为之一的，处以50元罚款：
（一）携带易燃易爆等危险物品的；
（二）在机动车行驶中跳车的。
第十条 驾驶非机动车有下列行为之一的，处以10元罚款：
（一）非机动车通过路口不按规定行驶的；
（二）不在非机动车道内行驶的；
（三）在没有非机动车道的道路上，不靠车行道右侧行驶的；
（四）违反规定进入专用车道行驶的；
（五）电动自行车、残疾人机动轮椅车超速行驶的；
（六）不按规定载物的；
（七）不在规定地点停放的；
（八）未设停放地点停放时妨碍其他车辆和行人通行的；
（九）违反规定驾驭畜力车的。
第十一条 驾驶非机动车有下列行为之一的，处以20元罚款：
（一）不按交通信号指示通行的；
（二）行经无灯控或者交警指挥的交叉路口，不按规定通行的；
（三）驾驶自行车、电动自行车、三轮车在路段上横过机动车道不按规定通行的；
（四）借道行驶后未迅速驶回非机动车道的；
（五）不按规定转弯或者超车的；
（六）牵引、攀扶其他车辆或者被其他车辆牵引的；
（七）双手离把或者手中持物的；
（八）扶身并行、互相追逐或者曲折竞驶的；
（九）在道路上骑独轮自行车或者2人以上骑行的自行车的；
（十）非下肢残疾的人驾驶残疾人机动轮椅车的；
（十一）自行车、三轮车加装动力装置的；
（十二）在道路上学习驾驶非机动车的。
第十二条 驾驶非机动车有下列行为之一的，处以50元罚款：
（一）逆向行驶的；
（二）醉酒驾驶的；
（三）不避让盲人的；
（四）进入高速公路的；
（五）遇有交通警察现场指挥时，不服从指挥的。
第十三条 驾驶非机动车违反交通管制的规定强行通行，不听劝阻的，处以200元罚款。
驾驶非机动车造成交通事故后逃逸，尚不构成犯罪的，处以300元罚款。
第十四条 驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以20元罚款：
（一）驾驶摩托车未按规定戴安全头盔的；
（二）未随车携带行驶证或者驾驶证的；
（三）拖拉机驶入省人民政府规定禁止通行道路的；
（四）不按规定放置已取得的机动车检验合格标志或者保险标志的。
第十五条 驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以50元罚款：
（一）不在机动车道内行驶的；
（二）违反规定使用专用车道的；
（三）不按规定车道行驶的；
（四）在同车道行驶中，不按规定与前车保持必要的安全距离的；
（五）通过交叉路口遇停止信号时，停在停止线以内或者无停止线停在路口内的；
（六）不按除指挥灯信号以外的交通信号规定通行的；
（七）拨打接听手持电话、观看电视或者有其他妨碍安全驾驶行为的；
（八）不按规定使用灯光的；
（九）道路养护施工作业车辆、机械作业时未开启示警灯和危险报警闪光灯的；
（十）驾驶人未按规定使用安全带的；
（十一）摩托车后座乘坐不满12周岁未成年人或者驾驶轻便摩托车载人的；
（十二）在车门、车厢没有关好时行车的；
（十三）客运机动车违反规定载货的；
（十四）未按规定鸣喇叭示意的；
（十五）在禁止鸣喇叭的区域或者路段鸣喇叭的；
（十六）驾驶安全设施不全的机动车的；
（十七）机动车喷涂、粘贴标识或者车身广告影响安全驾驶以及在机动车驾驶室的前后窗范围内悬挂、放置妨碍驾驶人视线物品的；
（十八）连续驾驶机动车超过4小时，其间停车休息时间少于20分钟的；
（十九）驾驶证被依法扣留期间仍驾驶机动车的；
（二十）违法记分达到12分仍驾驶拖拉机、摩托车的；
（二十一）拖拉机驶入大中城市中心城区内道路的；
（二十二）超过规定时速50％以下的；
（二十三）违反禁令标志、禁止标线、警告标志或者警告标线指示的。
第十六条 驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以100元罚款：
（一）通过有灯控的交叉路口时，不按规定进入导向车道或者不按导向车道标明方向行驶的；
（二）通过有灯控的交叉路口时，遇放行信号不依次通过的；
（三）通过有灯控的交叉路口时，向右转弯遇同车道内有车等候放行信号时，不依次停车等候的；
（四）准备进入环形路口的不让已在路口内的机动车先行的；
（五）路口遇有交通阻塞时未依次等候的；
（六）通过无灯控或者交通警察指挥的路口，不让优先通行的一方先行、不让右方道路的来车先行或者右转弯车辆不让左转弯车辆先行的；
（七）左转弯时，未靠路口中心点左侧转弯的；
（八）向道路上抛撒物品或者机动车载物行驶遗洒、飘散载运物的；
（九）不服从交通警察指挥的；
（十）使用他人机动车驾驶证驾驶机动车的；
（十一）驾驶证丢失、损毁的；
（十二）变更车道时影响正常行驶的机动车的；
（十三）转弯时不让直行的车辆、行人先行的；
（十四）行经人行横道，不按规定减速、停车、避让行人的；
（十五）不避让盲人的；
（十六）在单位院内、居民居住区内不低速行驶、不避让行人或者不按限速标志行驶的；
（十七）违反规定牵引挂车或者挂车载人的；
（十八）挂车的灯光信号、制动、联接、安全防护等装置不符合国家标准的；
（十九）驾驶机件不符合技术标准的机动车的；
（二十）未将可以移动的故障车辆移到不妨碍交通的地方停放的；
（二十一）在道路上发生故障或者事故后妨碍交通又难以移动，不按规定设置警告标志或者使用灯光的；
（二十二）下陡坡熄火或者空档滑行的；
（二十三）未悬挂机动车号牌，故意遮挡、污损或者不按规定安装机动车号牌的；
（二十四）连续驾驶超过4小时，其间未停车休息的；
（二十五）在没有划分机动车道、非机动车道和人行道的道路上，不按规定通行的；
（二十六）学习驾驶员不按指定时间、路线学习驾驶或者在教练不随车指导下上道路驾驶车辆的；
（二十七）学习驾驶员使用非教练车上道路驾驶的；
（二十八）使用教练车时有与教学无关的人员乘坐的；
（二十九）实习期内未粘贴或者悬挂实习标志的；
（三十）在实习期内驾驶禁止驾驶的车辆的；
（三十一）违反规定牵引故障机动车的；
（三十二）使用汽车吊车、轮式专用机械车、摩托车牵引车辆的；
（三十三）未使用专用清障车拖移转向或者照明、信号装置失效的机动车；
（三十四）牵引摩托车的；
（三十五）不按规定会车或者倒车的；
（三十六）载货长度、宽度、高度超过规定的；
（三十七）运载超限物品时不按指定的时间、路线、速度行驶或者未悬挂明显标志的；
（三十八）运载危险物品不按指定的时间、路线、速度行驶或者未悬挂警示标志、未采取必要的安全措施的；
（三十九）货运机动车违反规定附载作业人员的；
（四十）拖拉机载人的；
（四十一）遇前方机动车停车排队等候或者缓慢行驶时，从前方车辆两侧穿插、超越或者未依次交替驶入车道减少后的路口、路段的；
（四十二）在没有交通信号灯、交通标志、交通标线或者交警指挥的交叉路口遇到停车排队等候或者缓慢行驶时，机动车未依次交替通行的；
（四十三）遇前方机动车停车排队等候或者缓慢行驶时，在人行横道、网状线区域内停车等候的；
（四十四）行经铁路道口，不按规定通行的；
（四十五）载运超限物品行经铁路道口时不按铁路部门指定的道口或者指定的时间通过的；
（四十六）特种车辆违反规定使用警报器、标志灯具的；
（四十七）驾驶摩托车手离车把或者在车把上悬挂物品的；
（四十八）不避让正在作业的道路养护车、工程作业车或者通过施工作业路段不减速行驶的；
（四十九）行经漫水路或者漫水桥不低速通过的；
（五十）行经渡口，不依次待渡、上下渡船时不低速慢行或者不服从渡口管理人员指挥的；
（五十一）患有妨碍安全驾驶机动车的疾病或者服用国家管制的精神药品、麻醉药品驾驶机动车或者过度疲劳影响安全驾驶的；
（五十二）违法记分达到12分仍驾驶低速载货汽车、三轮汽车的。
第十七条 驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以150元罚款：
（一）违反规定临时停车且驾驶人不在现场的；
（二）在铁路道口、交叉路口、窄桥、弯道、陡坡、隧道、人行横道、交通流量大的路段等没有超车条件超车的；
（三）前车左转弯、掉头或者超车时超车的；
（四）与对面来车有会车可能时超车的；
（五）从右侧超车的；
（六）不按指挥灯信号规定通行的；
（七）违反规定临时停车拒绝立即驶离的；
（八）不在规定地点停放车辆并妨碍其他车辆、行人通行的。
第十八条 驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以200元罚款：
（一）逆向行驶的；
（二）超越执行紧急任务的警车、消防车、救护车、工程救险车的；
（三）不避让执行紧急任务的特种车辆的；
（四）违法记分达到12分仍驾驶其他机动车的；
（五）运载危险物品未办理通行手续的；
（六）上道路行驶未取得机动车检验合格标志的；
（七）不按规定掉头的；
（八）拖拉机驶入高速公路的；
（九）驾驶证超过有效期仍驾驶机动车的。
第十九条 饮酒后驾驶机动车的，处以1000元罚款；因饮酒后驾驶机动车被处罚，再次饮酒后驾驶机动车的，处以1500元罚款。
饮酒后驾驶营运机动车的，处以5000元罚款。
第二十条 机动车驾驶人有下列行为之一的，处以200元至1000元罚款：
（一）驾驶摩托车、拖拉机与驾驶证载明的准驾车型不相符合的，处以200元罚款；
（二）未取得驾驶证或者驾驶证被暂扣、被吊销期间驾驶拖拉机、摩托车的，处以200元罚款；
（三）在驾驶证暂扣期间仍驾驶低速载货汽车的，处以250元罚款；
（四）在驾驶证暂扣期间仍驾驶其他机动车的，处以300元罚款；
（五）把摩托车、拖拉机交给无驾驶证、驾驶证被吊销或者驾驶证被暂扣的人驾驶的，处以200元罚款；
（六）驾驶其他机动车与驾驶证载明的准驾车型不相符合的，处以250元罚款；
（七）未取得驾驶证或者驾驶证被吊销期间驾驶低速载货汽车、三轮汽车的，处以500元罚款；
（八）超过规定时速50％的，处以500元罚款；
（九）把低速载货汽车、三轮汽车交给无驾驶证、驾驶证被吊销或者驾驶证被暂扣的人驾驶的，处以500元罚款；
（十）驾驶营运客车与驾驶证载明的准驾车型不相符合的，处以1000元罚款；
（十一）未取得驾驶证或者驾驶证被吊销期间驾驶其他机动车的，处以1000元罚款；
（十二）把其他机动车交给无驾驶证或者驾驶证被吊销、被暂扣的人驾驶的，处以1000元罚款。
第二十一条 机动车载人超过核定人数的，每超１人处以50元罚款，最高不超过200元罚款。
公路客运车辆超过核定载客人数未达20％的，处以500元罚款；超过20％的，处以2000元罚款。
公路客运车辆违反规定载货的，处以500元罚款。
货运机动车违反规定载客的，处以500元罚款。
货运机动车载物超过核定载质量未达30％的，处以200元罚款；载物超过核定载质量30％的，处以500元罚款。
运输单位的车辆有本条第二款规定的情形，经处罚不改的，对直接负责的主管人员处以5000元罚款；有第三款至第五款规定的情形，经处罚不改的，对直接负责的主管人员处以2000元罚款。
第二十二条 机动车驾驶人有下列行为之一的，处以1000元罚款：
（一）造成交通事故后逃逸，尚不构成犯罪的；
（二）违反交通管制规定强行通行，不听劝阻的；
（三）非法安装警报器或者标志灯具的。
第二十三条 驾驶拼装或者报废的摩托车、拖拉机上道路行驶的，未从事营运的处以200元罚款；从事营运的，处以500元罚款。
驾驶拼装或者报废的其他机动车上道路行驶，未从事营运的，处以500元罚款；从事货运的，处以1000元罚款；从事客运的，处以2000元罚款。
第二十四条 机动车不按规定投保机动车第三者责任险的，处以依照规定投保最低责任限额应当缴纳的保险费的２倍罚款。
第二十五条 在高速公路上驾驶机动车有下列行为之一的，处以100元罚款：
（一）发生故障或者交通事故后，不按规定使用灯光或者设置警告标志的；
（二）从匝道进入或者驶离高速公路时不按规定使用灯光的；
（三）从匝道进入高速公路时妨碍已在高速公路内的机动车正常行驶的；
（四）在高速公路上的车道内停车的；
（五）非紧急情况下在应急车道上行驶或者停车的；
（六）超速不足50％的；
（七）驾驶禁止进入高速公路的机动车驶入高速公路的；
（八）违反规定拖曳故障车、肇事车的；
（九）正常情况下驾车低于规定最低时速行驶的；
（十）载货汽车车厢载人或者二轮摩托车载人的；
（十一）骑、轧车行道分界线或者在路肩上行驶的；
（十二）低能见度气象条件下不按规定行驶的。
第二十六条 在高速公路匝道上、加速车道上、减速车道上超车或者不按规定保持行车间距的，处以150元罚款。
第二十七条 在高速公路上驾驶机动车倒车、逆行、试车、穿越中央分隔带掉头或者学习驾驶机动车的，处以200元罚款。
第二十八条 伪造、变造机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以3000元罚款；伪造、变造检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2000元罚款。
第二十九条 有下列行为之一的，处以1000元至4000元罚款：
（一）驾驶摩托车、拖拉机使用伪造、变造的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以2000元罚款；使用伪造、变造的机动车检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以1000元罚款；
（二）驾驶摩托车、拖拉机使用其他车辆的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2000元罚款；
（三）驾驶非营运载客汽车使用伪造、变造的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以2500元罚款；使用伪造、变造的机动车检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2000元罚款 ；
（四）驾驶非营运载客汽车使用其他车辆的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2500元罚款；
（五）驾驶货运机动车使用伪造、变造的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以3000元罚款；使用伪造、变造的机动车检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2000元罚款；
（六）驾驶货运机动车使用其他车辆的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以3000元罚款；
（七）驾驶营运载客汽车使用伪造、变造的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以4000元罚款；使用伪造、变造的机动车检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2500元罚款；
（八）驾驶营运载客汽车使用其他车辆的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以4000元罚款；
（九）驾驶其他类型机动车使用伪造、变造的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、驾驶证的，处以3500元罚款；使用伪造、变造的机动车检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以2000元罚款；
（十）驾驶其他类型机动车使用其他车辆的机动车登记证书、号牌、行驶证、检验合格标志、保险标志的，处以3500元罚款。
第三十条 有下列行为之一，尚不构成犯罪的，处以1000元罚款：
（一）强迫驾驶人违反道路交通安全法律、法规和机动车安全驾驶要求驾驶机动车，造成交通事故的；
（二）故意损毁、移动、涂改交通设施，造成危害后果的。
第三十一条 有下列行为之一的，处以1000元罚款：
（一）在道路两侧及隔离带上种植树木、其他植物或者设置广告牌、管线等，遮挡路灯、交通信号灯、交通标志，妨碍安全视距拒不排除妨碍的；
（二）非法拦截、扣留机动车辆，不听劝阻，造成交通严重阻塞或者较大财产损失的。
第三十二条 出售已达到报废标准的机动车的，处以销售金额等额罚款。
擅自生产、销售未经国家机动车产品主管部门许可生产的机动车型的，生产、销售拼装的机动车或者生产、销售擅自改装的机动车的，处以非法产品价值5倍罚款。
机动车安全技术检验机构出具虚假检验结果的，处以所收检验费用的10倍罚款。
第三十三条 有下列行为之一的，处以100元罚款：
（一）其他机动车喷涂警车、消防车、救护车、工程救险车特定标志图案的；
（二）机动车未按规定喷涂放大的牌号的。
第三十四条 交通警察徇私舞弊、滥用职权，违反规定罚款的，由公安机关交通管理部门依法给予行政处分，并应当及时退还违反规定收取的罚款。
第三十五条 本规定自公布之日起施行。1996年3月29日贵州省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十次会议通过的《贵州省机动车交通安全管理条例》同时废止。
The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
