财政检查工作办法
财政部
财政检查工作办法
财政部第32号令
《财政检查工作办法》已经2006年1月10日部务会议讨论通过,现予公布,自2006年3月1日起施行。
部长 金人庆
二○○六年一月二十六日
财政检查工作办法
第一条 为了规范财政检查工作,保障和监督财政部门有效实施财政检查,保护公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益,根据《中华人民共和国预算法》、《财政违法行为处罚处分条例》等法律、行政法规,制定本办法。
第二条 县级以上人民政府财政部门及省级以上人民政府财政部门的派出机构(以下统称财政部门)依法实施财政检查,适用本办法。
第三条 本办法所称财政检查,是指财政部门为履行财政监督职责,纠正财政违法行为,维护国家财政经济秩序,对单位和个人执行财税法规情况以及财政、财务、会计等管理事项进行检查的活动。
第四条 财政部门实施财政检查,应当遵循合法、客观、公正、公开的原则。
第五条 财政部门应当按照法律、法规、规章和本办法的规定,在规定的职权范围内,实施财政检查,依法作出检查结论或处理、处罚决定。
对财政检查工作管辖发生争议的,报请共同的上一级财政部门指定管辖。
第六条 财政部门应当制定年度财政检查计划，按计划组织开展财政检查,或者根据日常财政管理需要,组织开展财政检查。
第七条 财政部门组织开展财政检查应当组成检查组,并指定检查组组长。检查组实行组长负责制。
第八条 检查组检查人员由财政部门工作人员组成。检查人员应当具备下列条件:
(一)熟悉有关法律、法规、规章和政策;
(二)掌握相关的专业知识;
(三)具有一定的调查研究、综合分析和文字表达能力。
第九条 根据需要,财政部门可以聘请专门机构或者具有专门知识的人员协助检查人员开展检查工作。
第十条 检查人员与被检查单位或个人(以下统称被检查人)有直接利害关系的,应当回避。被检查人认为检查人员与自己有利害关系的,可以要求检查人员回避。
检查人员的回避,由财政部门负责人决定。
第十一条 检查人员应当遵守国家有关保密规定,不得泄露检查中知悉的国家秘密和商业秘密,不得将检查中取得的材料用于与检查工作无关的事项。
第十二条 检查组在实施财政检查前,应当熟悉与检查事项有关的法律、法规、规章和政策,了解被检查人的基本情况,编制财政检查工作方案。
第十三条 财政部门实施财政检查，一般应于3个工作日前向被检查人送达财政检查通知书。
财政部门认为实施财政检查的3个工作目前向被检查人送达检查通知书对检查工作有不利影响时,经财政部门负责人批准,检查通知书可在实施财政检查前适当时间下达。
财政检查通知书的内容包括:
(一)被检查人的名称;
(二)检查的依据、范围、内容、方式和时间;
(三)对被检查人配合检查工作的具体要求;
(四)检查组组长及检查人员名单、联系方式;
(五)财政部门公章及签发日期。
第十四条 实施财政检查时,检查人员不得少于两人,并应当向被检查人出示证件。
检查人员可以向被检查人询问有关情况,被检查人应当予以配合,如实回答询问、反映情况。询问应当制作笔录,并由被检查人签字或盖章。
第十五条 实施财政检查时,检查人员可以要求被检查人提供有关资料,并可以对有关资料进行复制。
提供的资料是外国文字或少数民族文字记录的,被检查人应当将资料译成中文。
第十六条 实施财政检查时,检查人员可以运用查账、盘点、查询及函证、计算、分析性复核等方法。
第十七条 实施财政检查时,经财政部门负责人批准,检查人员可以向与被检查人有经济业务往来的单位查询有关情况,可以依法向金融机构查询被检查单位的存款。
检查人员查询存款时,应当持有财政部门签发的查询存款通知书,并负有保密义务。
第十八条 实施财政检查时,在有关证据可能灭失或者以后难以取得的情况下,经财政部门负责人批准,可以先行登记保存,并应当在7个工作日内及时作出处理决定。在此期间,被检查人或者有关人员不得销毁或者转移证据。
第十九条 检查人员在检查中取得的证明材料,应当有提供者的签名或者盖章。
未取得提供者签名或盖章的材料,检查人员应当注明原因。
第二十条 实施财政检查时,检查人员应当将检查内容与事项予以记录和摘录,编制财政检查工作底稿,并由被检查人签字或者盖章。
第二十一条 检查组组长应当对本组其他检查人员的工作质量进行监督,并对有关事项进行必要的审查和复核。
第二十二条 检查组在实施检查中,遇到重大问题应当及时向财政部门请示汇报。
第二十三条 检查工作结束前,检查组应当就检查工作的基本情况、被检查人存在的问题等事项书面征求被检查人的意见。被检查人自收到书面征求意见函之日起5个工作日内,提出书面意见或说明;在规定期限内没有提出书面意见或说明的,视为无异议。
第二十四条 检查组应于检查结束10个工作日内,向财政部门提交书面财政检查报告;特殊情况下,经批准提交财政检查报告的时间可以延长,但最长不得超过30日。
检查组在提交财政检查报告时,还应当一并提交行政处理、处罚建议或者移送处理建议以及财政检查工作底稿等材料。
第二十五条 财政检查报告应当包括下列内容:
(一)被检查人的基本情况;
(二)检查范围、内容、方式和时间;
(三)被检查人执行财税法规情况以及财政、财务、会计等管理事项的基本情况;
(四)被检查人存在财政违法行为的基本事实以及认定依据、证据;
(五)被检查人的意见或说明;
(六)应当向财政部门报告的其他事项;
(七)检查组组长签名及财政检查报告日期。
第二十六条 财政部门应当建立健全财政检查的复核制度,指定内部有关职能机构或者专门人员,对检查组提交的财政检查报告以及其他有关材料予以复核。
复核人员与被检查人或者检查人员有直接利害关系的,应当回避。
第二十七条 负责复核的有关职能机构或者专门人员，应当从以下几个方面对财政检查报告以及其他有关材料进行复核:
(一)检查事项认定的事实是否清楚;
(二)取得的证据是否真实、充分;
(三)检查程序是否合法;
(四)认定财政违法行为的法律依据是否适当;
(五)提出的行政处理、处罚建议或者移送处理建议是否适当;
(六)其他需要复核的事项。
有关职能机构或者专门人员对财政检查报告复核后,应当提出复核意见。
第二十八条 财政部门对财政检查报告和复核意见进行审定后,应当根据不同情况作出如下处理:
(一)对未发现有财政违法行为的被检查人作出检查结论;
(二)对有财政违法行为的被检查人依法作出行政处理、处罚决定;
(三)对不属于本部门职权范围的事项依法移送。
财政检查报告与复核意见存在重大分歧的,财政部门应当责成检查组进一步核实、补正有关情况或者材料;必要时,应当另行派出检查组,重新实施财政检查。
第二十九条 财政部门作出行政处理、处罚决定的,应当制作行政处理、处罚决定书。行政处理、处罚决定书应当载明以下事项:
(一)当事人的姓名或者名称、地址;
(二)违反法律、法规或者规章的事实和证据;
(三)行政处理、处罚的种类和依据;
(四)行政处理、处罚履行的方式和期限;
(五)不服行政处理、处罚决定,申请行政复议或者提起行政诉讼的途径和期限;
(六)作出行政处理、处罚决定的财政部门名称和日期;行政处理、处罚决定书必须盖有作出行政处理、处罚决定的财政部门印章。
第三十条 财政部门在作出行政处罚决定之前,应当告知当事人作出行政处罚的事实、理由及依据,并告知当事人依法享有的权利。
当事人有权进行陈述和申辩。财政部门必须充分听取当事人的意见,对当事人提出的事实、理由和证据,应当进行核查;当事人提出的事实、理由或者证据成立的,财政部门应当采纳。
第三十一条 财政部门作出应当告知听证权利的行政处罚决定之前,应当告知当事人有要求举行听证的权利;当事人要求听证的,财政部门应当组织听证。
财政部门举行听证的,依照《财政机关行政处罚听证实施办法》(财政部令第23号)的规定办理。
第三十二条 财政部门依法作出行政处理、处罚决定后,应当将行政处理、处罚决定书送达当事人。
行政处理、处罚决定书自送达之日起生效。
第三十三条 当事人对行政处理、处罚不服的,依照《中华人民共和国行政复议法》、《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的规定申请行政复议或者提起行政诉讼。
行政复议和行政诉讼期间,行政处理、处罚决定不停止执行,法律另有规定的除外。
第三十四条 财政部门应当依法对财政行政处理、处罚决定执行情况进行监督检查。
第三十五条 被检查人有财政违法行为的,财政部门可以公告其财政违法行为及行政处理、处罚、处分决定。
第三十六条 财政检查工作结束后,财政部门应当做好财政检查工作相关材料的立卷归档工作。
第三十七条 财政部门的工作人员在财政检查工作中,滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊的,依法给予行政处分。构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第三十八条 财政部门对财政检查工作中发现的影响财税政策、预算执行等方面的重要问题,应当及时向本级人民政府和上一级财政部门报告。
第三十九条 财政部门实施会计监督检查,适用本办法以及2001年2月20日财政部发布的《财政部门实施会计监督办法》(财政部令第10号)。
第四十条 本办法自2006年3月1日起施行。1998年10月8日财政部发布的《财政检查工作规则》(财监字[1998]223号)同时废止。
The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
